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CATFISH WARS: VIETNAM'S FIGHT FOR
FREE TRADE IN THE U.S. COURT OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Amalia R. Waltont
Abstract: Since the end of the Vietnam War, relations between the United States
and Vietnam have been largely based on trade, causing both cooperation and conflict.
Beginning in the 1990s, economic exchange between the two nations was encouraged
through the 1994 lifting of the post-war trade embargo, the 1998 waiver of the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment, and the signing of the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade
Agreement in 2000. Vietnam's successful catfish industry was born of this cooperation
but, soon after the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement went into effect, became the
source of international controversy.
U.S. catfish farmers responded to competition from lower-priced Vietnamese
catfish beginning with an advertising campaign and later by lobbying Congress for strict
product labeling laws. U.S. farmers then filed an anti-dumping complaint with the U.S.
Department of Commerce ("DOC"), which resulted in the United States imposing
anti-dumping tariffs on imported Vietnamese catfish. The Vietnamese catfish farmers
challenged the DOC with a still-pending lawsuit in the U.S. Court of International Trade
("CIT"). Unfortunately, the CIT is not a stabilizing force in this conflict because of its
structural defects. The CIT's deferential standard of review provides no significant check
on the discretion of the DOC, thus reducing the DOC's accountability. Moreover, CIT
decisions provide no precedential value and thus no guidance to parties in future cases.
In order to be effective and promote U.S. foreign trade relations, the CIT should consider
modifying its procedures for review of trade disputes.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2000, the United States signed its first bilateral trade agreement
with Vietnam,' encouraging the Vietnamese to expand private enterprise and
trade freely with the United States. At the suggestion of an American trade
delegation, the Vietnamese turned their natural catfish population into a
burgeoning business.2 Just three years later, in response to falling prices of
U.S.-grown catfish fillets, the United States imposed tariffs on the
increasingly successful Vietnamese catfish industry, reducing exports of the
Vietnamese product to the United States by more than half, from 630
The author would like to thank Professors Linda Hume, Sean O'Connor, Ken Gallant, David
Lindauer, and Alan Kirtley for their advice, encouragement, and time.
1 See discussion infra Part II.C.
2 Harvesting Poverty; The Great CatFish War, N.Y. TIMEs, July 22, 2003, at A18 [hereinafter
Harvesting Poverty].
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thousand pounds a month,3 to 296 thousand pounds a month.4 The
imposition of tariffs followed a colorful smear campaign by the Catfish
Farmers of America5 that accused the Vietnamese product of being a
"slippery catfish wannabe," 6 and suggested that it was contaminated with
Agent Orange.7 This campaign began the first significant post-bilateral trade
agreement trade dispute between the United States and Vietnam.s
The dispute escalated further in 2001 when U.S. catfish producers
filed an anti-dumping complaint against Vietnamese catfish farmers with the
U.S. Department of Commerce ("DOC"). Subsequently, the battle between
the two factions of catfish farmers proceeded to the U.S. Court of
International Trade ("CIT"), where the case is currently pending.
The only chance for review of U.S.-imposed tariffs on Vietnamese
catfish lies with the CIT. The Vietnamese producers do not have access to
review b , the World Trade Organization because Vietnam is not currently a
member. Because the CIT functions as an appellate court that applies a
deferential standard of review, the CIT cannot adequately resolve the dispute
or set precedent for future conflicts of the same nature.' 0
The possibility of similar conflict arising in the future is not merely
speculative. In December 2003, the Southern Shrimp Alliance filed a nearly
identical complaint with the DOC, accusing six shrimp-producing countries,
including Vietnam, of dumping." These economic attacks not only damage
3 AGRIC. STATISTICS BD., NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., CATFISH
PROCESSING (Nov. 2002), http://usda.nannlib.cornell.edu/reports/nassr/other/pcf-bb/2002/catfl202.pdf
[hereinafter CATFISH PROCESSING (Nov. 2002)].
4 AGRIC. STATISTICS BD., NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. (Dec. 2003),
http://usda.mannlib.comel.edu/reports/nassr/other/pcf-bb/2003/catf1203.pdf [hereinafter CATFISH
PROCESSING (Dec. 2003)].
5 The Catfish Farmers of America is an Arkansas-based group that serves as a member-based trade
organization for catfish farmers.
6 Harvesting Poverty, supra note 2.
7 Id.
8 MARK E. MANYN, LIBRARY OF CONG., THE VIETNAM-U.S. NORMAIZATION PROCESS 6 (2003),
http://fp)c.state.gov/documents/organization/27534.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2004 ).
A working party on the accession of Vietnam to the World Trade Organization ("WTO") was
formed in 1995 with the goal of offering Vietnam member status in 2005. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
ACCESSIONS: VIETNAM, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/acc-e/al-vietname.htm (last visited Feb.
11,2004).
10 An alternative to using the CIT is an agreement similar to the one Canada has with the United
States. This agreement uses binational panel reviews to evaluate trade disputes and guarantees an outcome
in 315 days. This type of system woald allow both countries to be heard equally and in a timely manner.
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1988).
SU.S. Shrimpers Seek a Duty on Imports, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2004, at C2. See also Notice of
Initiation of Antidumping Duty Investigations: Certain Frozen and Canned Warmwater Shrimp from
Brazil, Ecuador, India, Thailand, the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 69
Fed. Reg. 3876-03 (Jan. 27, 2004) [hereinafter Antidumping Duty Investigations]. On February 17, 2004,
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U.S.-Vietnam relations, but also jeopardize potential U.S. relations with
similarly situated countries that look to Vietnam as an example of what
might occur if they enter into similar trade agreements with the United
States.
This Comment illuminates the flawed reasoning the DOC used in
imposing tariffs on Vietnamese catfish and the structural flaws of the CIT
that will prevent Vietnamese farmers from attaining meaningful review.
Part II of this Comment addresses the development of trade relations
between the United States and Vietnam, beginning in the early 1990s. Part
III describes the threat U.S. catfish producers perceive from Vietnamese
catfish exports to the United States and the domestic measures they have
taken to protect their industry. Part IV explains the anti-dumping complaint
filed by U.S. catfish producers with the DOC and describes how the DOC
investigated that complaint. Finally, Part V addresses the suit filed in the
CIT by Vietnamese catfish farmers challenging the DOC's findings and its
decision to impose tariffs. This Part also analyzes potential arguments
Vietnamese farmers might make to show that a remand to the DOC is
necessary and also highlights prior CIT decisions that may help predict an
outcome in the case. This Comment concludes that changes in the DOC's
investigative process and in CIT review are needed to establish a consistent
and thereby stabilizing system for resolving anti-dumping disputes.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND VIETNAM
Until the catfish dispute arose, post-war U.S. relations with Vietnam
had improved markedly since the early 1990s. From the end of the Vietnam
War in 1975 until the early 1990s, a trade embargo froze economic relations
between the United States and Vietnam. 12 President Clinton opened free
economic exchange in 1994 when he ended the trade embargo against
Vietnam. 13  Positive relations then progressed with the opening of U.S.
liaison offices in Vietnam, 14 the appointment of the first U.S. Ambassador to
the U.S. International Trade Conmmission decided that Vietn&aese shrimp was being sold below fair value
in the United States and causing injury to the U.S. industry. This decision allows the U.S. DOC to continue
its anti-dumping investigation. A preliminary determination is due June 8, 2004. Andrew Beadle, Six
Countries Dumping Shrimp, Prawns in U.S., Commission Says, J. COM. ONLINE, Feb. 18, 2004.
12 MANYIN, supra note 8, at 1.
't Id. at 3.
14 id.
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Vietnam,15 the 1998 waiver of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, 16 and the
signing of the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement ("BTA") in 2001.17
The momentum created by these events transformed once embattled nations
into eager trading partners.'
8
A. The Normalization of U.S. Relations with Vietnam
Political and economic relations between the United States and
Vietnam improved greatly during the Clinton Administration. In the early
1990s, Vietnam contributed to post-war reconciliation by demonstrating a
willingness to find and return missing prisoners of war.'9 In response,
President Clinton launched a policy designed to normalize relations. The
goals of the normalization were to "encourage Vietnam's cooperation on
issues of interest to the United States and to promote Vietnam's integration
into the region and the world economy.",2' The normalization
simultaneously opened diplomatic and economic discourse between the
United States and Vietnam.
22
Elimination of the trade embargo in 1994 had an immediate economic
impact.23 U.S.-Vietnam trade increased from US$ 224 million in 1994 to
US$ 948 million in 1996.24 Trade slowed to US$ 666 million in 1997, in
part because of the Asian financial crisis, but reached US$ 827 million in
1998, and almost US$ 1 billion in 1999.25 This represents a total increase in
trade of over three hundred percent between 1994 and 1999.26 By 1999, the
United States was the seventh largest investor in Vietnam with US$ 120.2
million invested in Vietnamese enterprises.27
Development of positive trade relations allowed the United States to
move forward with normalizing foreign relations with Vietnam. In 1995, the
15 OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC'Y, WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: VIETNAM BILATERAL TRADE
AGREEMENT (July 13, 2000) [hereinafter FACT SHEET: VIETNAM], 2000 WL 967020 (White House).16 See discussion infra Part II.B.
17 OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC'Y, STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT: VIETNAM BILATERAL TRADE
AGREEMENT (June 8, 2001) [hereinafter STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT], 2001 WL 634226 (White House).
18 See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
19 FACT SHEET: VIETNAM, supra note 15.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 MANYIN, supra note 8, at 3.
23 Id. at 6.
24 H.R. REP. No. 106-794, at 3 (2000).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
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United States and Vietnam "settled diplomatic and private property claims
and opened liaison offices in Washington and Hanoi. 28 In April 1997,
Douglas "Pete" Peterson became the first U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam and
took up his post in Hanoi.29 With diplomatic relations strengthened,
President Clinton took a final step toward fully normalized relations with
Vietnam in 1998 by granting a waiver of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment
30
and opening the door to a possible trade agreement.
B. The Jackson- Vanik Amendment Waiver
The Jackson-Vanik Amendment31 was designed to prevent emigration
abuses and, if waived by the President, carries significant economic benefits
for foreign countries. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment lists three violations
of emigration rights.32 If the President determines that a country is not
committing these violations and that granting the waiver will substantially
promote the objectives of freedom of emigration, he is authorized to waive
the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. 3 The waiver allows the President to grant
Normal Trade Relations ("NTR") 34 status to a non-market economy 35
country.36 President Clinton authorized a waiver in connection with
Vietnam because Vietnam had made significant progress in promoting
orderly and legal emigration.37 The President believed that providing the
waiver would encourage Vietnam to be more cooperative on emigration in
the future and that waiver therefore promoted the best interests of the United
States.3"
Waiver of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment is not permanent and must
2s MANYIN, supra note 8, at 3.
29 FACT SHEET: VIETNAM, supra note 15.
30 Exec. Order No. 13,079, 63 Fed. Reg. 17,309 (Apr. 7, 1998).
3 The Jackson-Vanik Amendment is an amendment to the Trade Act of 1974. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2192,
2193, 2432, 2437, 2439 (2001). The Trade Act of 1974 is meant to promote free international trade,
stimulate competition, and encourage economic growth within the United States. 19 U.S.C. § 2102 (2001).
32 19 U.S.C. § 2432(a). The violations are: (1) denying citizens the right to emigrate; (2) imposing
more than a nominal fee or consequence on emigration; and (3) imposing more than a nominal fee or
consequence on any citizen desiring to emigrate.
3 Id. § 2432(c).
34 Formerly known as Most Favored Nation status. International Revenue Service Restructuring and
Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 5003(b)(2), 112 Stat. 685.
" See infra Part IV.B.
36 19 U.S.C. § 2432(b).
37 Press Briefing, Mike McCurry, Office of the Press Secretary, White House (Mar. 11, 1998), 1998
WL 107478.
39 id.
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occur annually. 39 To renew the waiver, the President must submit a
recommendation for a twelve-month extension no later than thirty days
before the waiver's expiration date.40 This waiver continues in effect unless
"disapproved" by Congress within sixty calendar days after the expiration of
the prior waiver.41 Disapproval by Congress must be in the form of a joint
resolution disapproving of the President's waiver determination.42 The
United States has renewed Vietnam's waiver every year from 1998 to
2003.43
Waiving the Jackson-Vanik Amendment provides a number of
benefits to Vietnam. First, the waiver allows the United States to extend
export promotion and investment support programs to Vietnam."4 Second,
the waiver enables Vietnam to be eligible to sign an agreement granting
NTR status.45 NTR status creates a reciprocal agreement under which both
parties agree not to extend trade preferences to a third party country that are
more favorable than the preferences established in the agreement.46  All
products from countries with NTR status are subject to the same tariffs upon
entering the United States 47 and changes in tariffs are applied equally to all
48status countries.
Waiver of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment also has economic benefits
for U.S. businesses. Waiving the Amendment allows U.S. exporters doing
business in Vietnam access to U.S. government programs that provide
credits and credit or investment guarantees. 49 These benefits are provided by
agencies such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the
Export-Import Bank, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture.50 Indeed, in
March of 1998, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and Vietnam
signed an agreement that led to a US$ 2.3 million loan to Caterpillar Inc.'s
39 19 U.S.C. § 2432(d)(1).
40 id.
41 19 U.S.C. § 2432.
42 Id.
43 MANYIN, supra note 8, at 4-5. See also Vietnamese Products Approval, Pub. L. No. 107-52, 115
Stat. 268 (2001).
44 FACT SHEET: VIETNAM, supra note 15.
45 id.
46 International Trade Data System, Normal Trade Relations (Formerly known as Most
Favored-Nation Status MFN), Dec. 19, 2002, http://www.itds.treas.gov/mfn.html (last visited Feb. 11,
2004). Id.
48 id.
49 H.R. REP. No. 106-794, at 2-3 (2000).
so Id.
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authorized dealership in Vietnam.' The following month, the
Export-Import Bank52 announced that it would finance sales to Vietnam and
signed two framework agreements with the State Bank of Vietnam later that
year. 3 The waiver also made commercial sales of agricultural commodities
to Vietnam eligible for coverage by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's
Southeast Asia Regional Export Credit Guarantee Program.5 4  This
economic cooperation paved the way for a U.S.-Vietnam bilateral trade
agreement.
55
C. The U.S.- Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement
The United States and Vietnam fully normalized their economic
relationship by signing the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement
("BTA") in 2000.s The BTA, along with the continued waiver of the
Jackson-Vanick Amendment, allowed Vietnam to achieve and maintain
NTR status.5 7 The Clinton Administration hailed the BTA as "committing
Vietnam to sweeping economic reform., 58  The BTA was to "advance
reform by leading to significantly more open markets and to Vietnam's
s Id. Caterpillar Inc. is a Fortune 100 company that manufactures construction and mining
equipment, diesel and natural gas engines, and industrial gas turbines. See generally CATERPILLAR,
COMPANY INFORMATION, http://www.caterpillar.com/about-cat/companyinformation/company_
information.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
52 The Export-Import Bank is the official export credit agency of the United States. The agency
assists in financing the export of U.S. goods and services to international markets. See generally EXPORT-
IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.exim.gov/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
5' H.R. REP. NO. 106-794, at 3.
54 Id. The Export Credit Guarantee Program encourages the sale of U.S. "exports to buyers in
countries where credit is necessary to maintain or increase U.S. sales, but where financing may not be
available without such credit guarantees." This is accomplished by underwriting credit extended by the
U.S. private banking sector to foreign banks to pay for food and agricultural products sold to foreign
buyers. FAS, FACT SHEET: CCC EXPORT CREDIT GUARANTEE PROGRAMS (GSM-102/103) (2001),
http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/factsheets/gsmprog.hftl (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
5' U.S. expansion into Vietnamese markets continues. Most recently, due to a December 2003
decision allowing direct flight from Vietnam to the United States for the first time since the end of the
Vietnam War, American Airlines has opened its first office in Vietnam See American Airlines Opens in
Vietnam, CNN, Jan. 30, 2004, at http://us.cnn.com/2004/TRAVEIJO1/30/biz.trav.aa.vietnam.reut/ (last
visited Feb. 11, 2004); US. and Vietnam Agree on DirectAir Travel, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2003, at Al 1.
56 STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT, supra note 17. The BTA was passed by the U.S. Senate and
signed by President Bush on July 13, 2000. Agreement Between the United States of America and the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Trade Relations, July 13, 2000, ch. 1, art. 1, 2001 WL 1792868.
57 Vietnam's Normal Trade Relations ("NTR") status is on a waiver basis only. Vietnamese
Products Approval, Pub. L. No. 107-52, 115 Stat. 268 (2001). Granting of Permanent Normal Trade
Relations will be considered upon Vietnam's accession to the World Trade Organization. U.S.-Vietnam
Trade Council, U.S.-Vietnam NTR Status and the Bilateral Trade Agreement,
http://www.usvtc.org/Fact%20Sheets/bta_ntr.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
58 FACT SHEET: VIETNAM, supra note 15.
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firmer integration into the global economic community. 5 9
Analysis of the BTA's legislative history suggests that it was intended
to create a "transparent, predictable business market" and promote
Vietnamese free private enterprise.60  A Senate report approving the
extension of Vietnam's NTR status described the BTA transparency article
as "requiring that laws, rules and procedures be regularly and promptly
published... [and] that nationals of each country be given a fair opportunity
to comment on the formulation of laws, rules and procedures...."61 The
report also states that, to facilitate this goal, the BTA parties must administer
their laws in a "uniform, impartial, and reasonable manner., 62 In testimony
encouraging the approval of the BTA, Stanley 0. Roth, the U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, stated that the BTA
was in the United States' interest because it would strengthen Vietnam's
private sector, giving ordinary Vietnamese citizens the power to determine
their own economic future.63 Thus, the BTA was designed to both benefit
Vietnamese citizens and further U.S. foreign policy.
The United States also linked a transparent market and free private
enterprise with loftier ideological goals for Vietnam. By opening trade
relations, the United States also expected to foster the rule of law and
democracy in Vietnam.6 Robert B. Zoellick, the U.S. Trade Representative,
emphasized that American ideals are entangled with free trade and private
enterprise, stating that, "[t]rade promotes freedom by supporting the
development of the private sector, encouraging the rule of law, spurring
economic liberty, and increasing freedom of choice."
65
Despite its supporters' optimism, commentators predicted the BTA
59 id.
60 Trade With Vietnam: Hearing Before the Sen. Subcomm. on Int'l Econ. Policy, Exports and Trade
Promotion and the Sen. Subcomm. on East Asian and Pac.-Affairs, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of
Douglas "Pete" Peterson, U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam) [hereinafter statement of Pete Peterson].
6I S. REP. No. 107-49, at 5 (2001) (quote from statement of Douglas "Pete" Peterson, Ambassador to
Vietnam).
62 Id. at 8.
63 International Economic Policy and Trade US.-Vietnam Trade: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on Int'l Relations, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Stanley 0. Roth, Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs). See also Statement of Pete Peterson, supra note 60 (stating that the
BTA will "produce greater economic freedom and commercial opportunity for domestic private enterprise
empowering the Vietnamese people to direct their own economic destiny.").
4 A Senate report on the BTA stated that normalized economic ties between the United States and
Vietnam would create an "increasingly open society governed by the rule of law and democratic principles
(in Vietnam]." S. REP. No. 107-49, at 10.
65 Argentina Collapse IMF Role Review: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Fin., 107th Cong.
(2002) (statement of Robert B. Zoellick, U.S. Trade Representative).
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would have some negative economic consequences for the United States.66
Although some U.S. businesses would benefit greatly from investment
opportunities in the newly opened Vietnamese market, free trade between
the countries would not be positive for every U.S. business.67 Congress
predicted that granting normalized trade relations through the BTA would
affect the composition of Vietnamese exports to the United States and
certain goods would be exported to the United States in larger volume after
high tariffs were removed. Specifically, a Senate report predicted that the
U.S. processed food industry would be negatively affected. 9 Shortly after
its passage, many of the BTA's predicted benefits, and negative
consequences were realized in Vietnam's burgeoning catfish industry.
III. TRADE RELATIONS LEAD TO CONFLICT BETWEEN U.S. AND
VIETNAMESE CATFISH PRODUCERS
Vietnamese catfish exports to the United States proliferated after the
70BTA's implementation. Because Vietnamese catfish production
techniques cost less than those in the United States, the relatively
inexpensive Vietnamese exports threatened the U.S. catfish industry.7' U.S.
farmers fought back with aggressive advertising and lobbying for new
labeling requirements.72
A. Differences in U.S. and Vietnamese Catfish Farming Techniques
Result in Lower-Priced Vietnamese Catfish
Both Vietnamese and U.S. farmers use similar, integrated techniques
for raising and processing catfish.73 Vietnamese farmers, however, have at
least one significant advantage that lowers their cost of production; they are
able to produce catfish more efficiently because the fish are raised in their
natural habitat and thrive without much farmer intervention. 7
6 S. REP. No. 107-49, at 9.
67 id.
6 Id.
69Id.
70 Nguyen XuAn Thinh, Catfish Fight: Vietnam's Tra and Basa Fish Exports to the U.S. 6 (Mar.
2003) (unpublished case study, on file with author).
I, Notice of Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam, 68 Fed. Reg. 47909 (Aug. 12, 2003) [hereinafter Notice of Antidumping Duty Order].
72 See discussion infra Part H.B-C.
73 See discussion infra Part Ill.A. 1-2.
74 Nguyin, supra note 70, at 2.
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1. Vietnamese Catfish Farming Techniques
Vietnamese farmers raise their catfish relatively efficiently by locatin
their farms in natural catfish habitats, primarily in the Mekong River Delta.
The Vietnamese catfish industry became especially lucrative in 1995 when
breeding technology7 was introduced and fingerlings 76 no longer had to be
caught in the wild. 7  Because Vietnamese farmers "bring the farm to the
fish" by raising their catfish fingerlings in cages submerged under
houseboats, the purchase and construction of the cages accounts for their
largest initial investment cost.78  Recurring expenses include fingerlings,
7 80feed, labor, fuel, disease control, interest and taxes.7 9 The cost to raise tra,
a type of catfish, is about thirty cents per pound.8'
Fish processing plants in Vietnam are located in close proximity to the
farms, further lowering the cost of producing frozen fish fillets.82 At the
processing plant, whole adult fish are washed, fileted, skinned, packed, and
frozen for export.83  Most processors use imported machinery in their
factories and subscribe to health standards84 created by the U. S. Food and
Drug Administration. 5
Between the passage of the BTA in 2000 and 2002, the volume of
Vietnamese catfish exported to the United States rose from 8624 tons to
20,965 tons (a 143% increase).8 6 By September 2002, 94% of the 670,000
pounds of frozen boneless catfish fillets exported to the United States were
from Vietnam. 7 A year later, after tariffs were imposed,88 exports to the
United States were down 77% to 150,000 pounds.89
75 Id.
76 A fingerling is a fish in its very early stages of development.
77 Nguyin, supra note 70, at 2. From 1996 to 2000 export volume to the United States rose from 98
tons to 8624 tons (an 8700% increase in volume and a US$ 29,211,366 increase in value). Id. at 6.
78 Id. at 2. A small cage costs roughly US$ 6385.
79 Id.
go Tra and basa are two types of Vietnamese-farmed catfish.
st Calculated using data from Nguyin, supra note 70, at 4. Unit cost of 10,398 Vietnam Dong /
kilogram of fish * 2.2 lbs. = 30 cents per pound (based on a conversion rate of US$ 1= 15,709.00 VND).
This prce is an approximation using numbers from the most expensive inputs.
?I Id. at 5.
83 id.
84 CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED NUTRITION, HAZARD ANALYSIS CRITICAL CONTROL
POINTS (2003), at http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/-lrd/haccp.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
:' Nguy~n, supra note 70, at 5.
86 Id. at 6.
87 CATFISH PROCESSING (Nov. 2002), supra note 3.
'8 See infra Part IV.B.
89 CATFISH PROCESSING (Dec. 2003), supra note 4. Vietnamese exports to the United States were
replaced with exports from China and Guyana.
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2. U.S. Catfish Farming Techniques
Catfish farming in the United States is more costly than Vietnamese
catfish farming because of higher overhead and labor costs. 90 Catfish
farming began as an industry in the United States .in the 1960s,91 with both
small and large-scale farms.92 The smaller growers make more money by
selling live fish or providing event catering using their own farm-grown
fish.93 The larger farms are generally integrated, meaning they have their
own processing plants.94 Because the price of U.S.-grown catfish dropped
around the time the BTA was implemented, these larger farming and
processing operations claim to have been negatively affected by the
Vietnamese catfish industry.95
Large U.S. catfish farms have high operating costs because they
utilize state-of-the-art technology, mechanization, and artificially-created
environments for their fish.96 Farm operators excavate artificial holding
ponds and then pump in fresh water, constantly maintaining optimal oxygen
levels. 97 Farmers often employ workers twenty-four hours a day to monitor
the ponds and ensure that pump problems are caught immediately and the
fish have a steady level of oxygen.98 Employees record water quality,
temperature, and oxygen levels at least once a day99 and may apply
herbicides to control growth of weeds and algae in the ponds. 00 A sample
yearly budget of a fish farm producing 65,625 pounds of catfish shows a
total yearly budget of US$ 43,492,101 a cost of about sixty-six cents per
pound of fish--or more than two times the price of producing Vietnamese
90 ROBERT M. DURBOROW, CATFISH FARMING IN KENTUCKY 9 (2000), available at
http://www.ksuaquaculture.org/Catflsh.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
9' Id. at 4.
92 Id.
9' Id. at 12.
94 For a description of catfish processing techniques, see SOUTHERN PRIDE, CATFISH PROCESSING, at
http://www.southempride.net/fannprocess/plant.htrnl (last visited Feb. 11, 2004); DELTA PRIDE, THE
DELTA PRIDE DIFFERENCE: FROM THE FARM TO THE PLATE, at
http://www.deltapride.com/coinfo.difference.htm. (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
95 Notice of Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value, Affirmative Preliminary
Determination of Critical Circumstances and Postponement of Final Determination: Certain Frozen Fish
Fillets from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 68 Fed. Reg. 4986 (Jan. 31, 2003) [hereinafter Notice of
Preliminary Determination of Sales].
96 DURBOROW, supra note 90, at 9.
97 id.
98 Id.
99 See id. at 9, 63, 76.
'oo See id. at 94.
'0' Id. at 22.
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catfish.102
Integrated farms benefit from economies of scale and comprehensive
quality control. Operations that both raise and process their own fish are
referred to as "vertically integrated."' 03 The integration of the raising and
processing of the fish is touted as increasing the quality and freshness of the
product."°4 Farms that manage each stage of the catfish production process,
from fingerling to fillet, can ensure that everything is in accordance with
their particular standards. 0 5 Promotional websites emphasize the freshness
of the water in the ponds, the quality of the feed, the speed and reliability of
company-owned refrigeration trucks, and the efficiency of their processing
plants. 106
B. U.S. Catfish Farmers Launch an Advertising Campaign to Promote
Their Product
After the BTA went into effect, sales of U.S.-grown frozen catfish
fillets rose, but the average price per pound dropped steadily. 0 7 U.S. catfish
farmers, daunted by the disparity in production costs with Vietnam, tried to
win back their business by running an advertising campaign distinguishing
U.S. catfish from its Vietnamese counterpart."' The campaign, sponsored
by Catfish Farmers of America, 0 9 emphasized the difference between U.S.
and Vietnamese catfish varieties and the different environments in which the
fish are raised." 0 The campaign accused Vietnamese fish of being a
102 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
103 See generally AMERICA'S CATCH, How WE Do IT, at http://www.catfish.com/2003/comnpmid.html
(last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
:04 For a product promotion based on this theory see SOUTHERN PRIDE, supra note 94.
05 See, e.g., DELTA PRIDE, supra note 94 (stating that, from the earliest stages, Delta Pride catfish are
held to the strictest standards for quality).
106 See, e.g., HEARTLAND CATFISH, WELCOME TO HEARTLAND CATFISH, at
http://www.heartlandcatfishocom (last visited Feb. 11, 2004) ("Our catfish are the most pampered fish you
can buy. You see, at Heartland, we control absolutely every stage of their growth and processing. From
fingerlings to final products, they're never out of our hands. Our vertically intergrated [sic] approach
assures you the finest quality fish on the market.").
107 AGRIC. STATISTICS BD., NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., at
http://usda.mannlib.comell.edu/reports/nassr/other/pcf-bb/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2004). The volume of
imported frozen fillets also dropped during this time period. Id.
,o Harvesting Poverty, supra note 2.
109 See supra note 5.
,10 Harvesting Poverty, supra note 2. In 2001, when the Food and Drug Administration sought an
expert opinion on species identification of catfish, they consulted Dr. Carl J. Ferraris Jr., an adjunct curator
of ichthyology at the California Academy of Sciences who specializes in the world's catfish species. Dr.
Ferraris confirmed that there is "no justification, historically or scientifically," for limiting the word catfish
VOL. 13 No. 2
CATFISH WARs." VIETNAM'S FIGHT FOR FREE TRADE
"slippery catfish wannabe," "probably not even sporting real whiskers," and
"float[ing] around in Third World rivers nibbling on who knows what.""'
One U.S. company wrote that the fish from Vietnam "is different [from U.S.
fish] and so are the farming conditions--not to mention government
standards for quality, cleanliness and safety."' 12 Congressman Marion Berry
(D-Arkansas) was reputedly involved in a campaign suggesting that
Vietnamese catfish are contaminated with Agent Orange." 3  His
Washington, D.C. office, however, denies his involvement.14
C. Congress Passes Two Laws Regulating the Use of the Word "Catfish"
on Product Labeling
Adding to the threat of serious competition, consumers were easily
confused by the labels on Vietnamese catfish fillets.' 1 The Vietnamese fish
were originally exported to the United States under the names "basa" and
"tra" but, because U.S. consumers did not recognize this product as catfish,
Vietnamese exporters changed the packaging to read "catfish." ' 1 6 In some
instances, new packaging even referred to the fish as being "fresh delta,"
causing the Mekong River Delta to be confused with the Mississippi River
Delta. 117 Because it was impossible to distinguish the two products in stores,
U.S. farmers lost any advantage they may have had from being local."'
The U.S. catfish farmers successfully lobbied their congressional
representatives to create labeling standards. On July 10, 2001, eleven
congressional representatives from catfish farming states 19 introduced
House Bill 2439.2 °  The bill would have amended the Agricultural
Marketing Act of 1946 by requiring farm-raised fish retailers to inform
to North American catfish. Elizabeth Becker, Delta Farmers Want Copyright on Catish, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
16, 2002, at Al.
... Harvesting Poverty, supra note 2.
112 DELTA PRIDE, MADE IN AMERICA, at http://www.deltapride.com/co-infoamerican.htm (last
visited Feb. 11, 2004).
113 Harvesting Poverty, supra note 2.
114 Telephone Interview with Nathan Reed, Legislative Aide to Congressman Berry (Nov. 3, 2003).
: Nguyin, supra note 70, at 8.
16 Id. at 5.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 8.
119 Those representatives were: Mike Ross (AR), Marion Berry (AR), Chip Pickering (MS), Bennie
Thompson (MS), Ronnie Shows (MS), Harold Ford (TN), Max Sandlin (TX), Brad Carson (OK), Mike
Thomgson (CA), Jim Turner (TX), and Jane Harman (CA). See H.R. 2439, 107th Cong. (2001).
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consumers of the commodities' country of origin at the final point of sale. 121
While this bill was ruled out of order and never became law, 122 the
representatives in support of the bill were not deterred.
Within the next year, they passed two new pieces of legislation aimed
at protecting the U.S. catfish industry. 23 First, a section of the Agricultural,
Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 2002 prohibited any funds it appropriated to be used
in allowing admission of fish labeled "catfish" unless it was of the
ictaluridae family. 124 Ictaluridae is the only type of catfish native to North
America. 125 On May 13, 2002, the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act
of 2002 became law.' 26  It further limits the use of the word "catfish" on
labeling to fish classified within the family ictaluridae. 127  Lobbying
successfully for the passage of these acts marked the end of U.S. farmers'
quest for a domestic remedy.
IV. U.S. CATFISH PRODUCERS SEEK AN INTERNATIONAL REMEDY
U.S. catfish farmers pursued protections beyond the domestic labeling
victory and advertising campaign. 128 On June 28, 2002, the Catfish Farmers
of America, along with eight individual processors, 129  sought an
international remedy130 by lodging an anti-dumping complaint 131 with the
121 Id.
:22 Dan Morgan, Vietnamese Ca(fsh Rile Southern Lawmakers, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2001, at A19.
23 See infra notes 124, 126.
124 Agricultural, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-76, § 755, 115 Stat. 704.
1'5 Catfish species grown in Vietnam are pangasius bocourti, pangasius hypophthalmus, and
pangasius sutchi. FACT SHEET: NEW U.S. LAW DOES NOT PROHIBIT EXPORT OF VIETNAMESE FISH TO THE
U.S. (2001), http://hanoi.usembassy.gov/wwwhcatfish01 123 l.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).26 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 10806, 116 Stat. 134.
127 id.
121 In May 2002, U.S. prices for frozen fish fillets were down eighteen cents a pound from the prior
year. AGRIC. STATISTICS BD., NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., CATFISH
PROCESSING 1 (June 2002), http://usda.mannlib.comel.edu/reports/nassr/other/pcf-bb/2002/catfO602.pdf
(last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
129 Notice of Preliminary Determination of Sales, supra note 95. The eight individual U.S. catfish
processors are America's Catch, Inc., Consolidated Catfish Co., L.L.C., Delta Pride Catfish, Inc., Harvest
Select Catfish, Inc., Heartland Catfish Company, Pride of the Pond, Simmons Farm Raised Catfish, Inc.,
and Southern Pride Catfish Co. Id.
130 Although the DOC is not an international forum, a DOC determination can provide a solution that
affects trade on an international level.
131 An anti-dumping complaint asserts that a foreign producer is selling its product in the United
States for less than it is being sold in the exporting country. This also implies that the foreign producer is
selling the product at less than the cost of producing it.
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DOC against Vietnamese catfish farmers.' 32  The DOC investigated the
complaint and later issued a final report, which resulted in the imposition of
tariffs on Vietnamese catfish exports to the United States in 2003.' 33 The
Vietnamese farmers responded with a lawsuit against the DOC in the CIT.'
34
A. Review ofAnti-Dumping Complaints
Two separate, quasi-judicial U.S. administrative agencies review anti-
dumping complaints such as the complaint filed against the Vietnamese
catfish producers. 35  A petitioner initiates an anti-dumping case by
simultaneously filing a complaint with the DOC and the International Trade
Commission.' 6 The International Trade Commission 137 then investigates
whether the domestic industry has been injured. 138 At the same time, the
DOC determines whether dumping has actually occurred and, if it finds that
it has, may impose tariffs on the offending party.' 39 Both agencies must find
for the plaintiff for the case to continue.14 Because the finding of injury by
the International Trade Commission is not contested by the Vietnamese
producers, this Comment analyzes the DOC's process.'
4 1
The DOC, an independent agency headed by the Secretary of
Commerce, investigates the complaint and determines if there has been
dumping of the named product.' 42  The petition that initiates the
investigation supplies the bulk of the information used to make this
determination.' 4  The DOC also gathers facts by sending questionnaires to
132 Notice of Antidumping Duty Order, supra note 71.
133 Id.
'34 See infra Part V.
35 STEVEN HUsTED & MICHAEL MELVIN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 241 (4 h ed. 1998).
136 Id.
' The U.S. International Trade Commission ("ITC") is an independent, quasi-judicial federal agency
that functions very similarly to the DOC. During its investigation, the ITC collects data on the domestic
industry suffering alleged injury as well as prices and quantities of imports. Using this data, the ITC
determines if the state of the domestic industry is due to dumping of the foreign product named in the
complaint. The ITC must find this link in order for the DOC to impose tariffs. Id.
139 id.
'39 Id. at 242.
140 Id.
141 An Giang Agric. & Food Imp. Co. v. United States, No. 03-00563 (Ct. Int'l Trade filed Aug. 20,
2003) [hereinafter An Giang Complaint].
I 2 The responsibility of investigating the size of dumping margins was transferred from the Treasury
Department to the DOC in 1980. HUSTED & MELVIN, supra note 135, at 242.
143 Although the Secretary of Commerce has the power to initiate dumping investigations, the
investigation is normally initiated by a petition filed by a domestic interested party. Necessary contents of
a petition are listed in 19 C.F.R. § 351.202 (2003).
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the respondents, in this case the Vietnamese fish farming companies.'" The
DOC commissioners, who are appointed by the President, compare the
product's export price and the product's normal value in the exporting
country. 45  Dumping has occurred if the export price is lower than the
normal value.'" Any interested party may request a hearing on arguments
they plan to raise during the investigation. 47 Hearings, however, are not
subject to many of the Administrative Procedure Act's procedural
safeguards. 4 8  For example, witnesses are not subject to oath or
cross-examination, although the chair of the hearing may ask questions of
persons or witnesses. 149 If one of the parties does not agree with the final
DOC determination, that party may appeal to the CIT.150
B. The DOC Investigation and Report of the Vietnamese Catfish
Producers
In conducting its nearly year-long investigation, the DOC first
determined that Vietnam is a non-market economy, which made its
determination of the normal value of catfish particularly complicated.'
5
'
This section briefly explains the DOC's valuation process.1
52
A "non-market economy" does not operate on "market principles of
cost and pricing structures,"' 53 but instead is subject to artificial government
control. The result is that product prices in the non-market economy do not
reflect the product's fair value. 54  By law, the DOC must determine the
"normal value" of a non-market economy product based on "the value of the
'44 19 C.F.R. § 351.301(a).
145 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a).
'46 Normal value is the price at which the foreign product is sold in the exporting country in the
ordinary course of trade. Id. § 1677b(a)(1)(B)(i).
147 19 C.F.R. § 351.310(c).
14s Id. § 351.310(d)(2). See generally Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
The Administrative Procedure Act was designed to make government agencies more accountable. Marci
A. Hamilton & Clemens G. Kohnen, The Jurisprudence of Information Flow: How the Constitution
Constructs the Pathways ofInformation, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 267, 286 (2003) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 76-
1149, at 2 (1939)).
149 19 C.F.R. § 351.310(d)(2).
150 19 U.S.C. § 1516a. In the case of an appeal, the appealing party, in this case, the Vietnamese
producers, is represented by private counsel in their suit against the U.S. governmental agency.
11 Notice of Preliminary Determination of Sales, supra note 95, at 4990.
IS2 See infra Part V.B for a more detailed discussion.
153 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A). In identifying a non-market economy, the DOC considers currency
convertibility, wage rates, permitting of joint ventures or foreign investment, governmental control of
production, allocation of resources and price and output decisions, among other factors. Id. § 1677(18)(B).
"4 Id. § 1677(18)(A).
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factors of production utilized in producing the merchandise."'' 5 5  Such
"factors of production" include items like the cost of labor, raw materials,
energy, and capital costs. 15 6 The DOC must value these factors in the non-
market economy based on known price and cost data from a surrogate
country with a market economy considered appropriate by the DOC. 5 7 The
DOC uses data from companies in the surrogate country to produce its
preliminary anti-dumping determination.15
8
After applying this process, the DOC issued a notice of preliminary
determination that eventually led to an anti-dumping duty order on
Vietnamese frozen catfish fillets.'5 9  In its determination, the DOC found
that frozen fish fillets were sold in the United States at less than their normal
value.' 60  In turn, the DOC required Vietnamese exporters to give a cash
deposit or post a bond equal to the dumping margin calculated in the
preliminary determination.' 1 After the preliminary determination, the DOC
invited both parties to contest the findings, which they did.162  The DOC
filed its final determination in June 2003,163 and published its anti-dumping
duty order against Vietnamese frozen fish fillets in August 2003.164  Later
that month, the eleven Vietnamese exporters named in the final
anti-dumping order filed a lawsuit in the CIT challenging that order.' 65
The complaint filed in the CIT by the Vietnamese producers argues
that the DOC incorrectly calculated the normal value of their product by
valuing the whole, pre-processed fish as a factor of production and not
15 Id. § 1677b(c)(1)(B).
156 Id. § 1677b(c)(3)(A)-(D).
157 Id. § 167Th(c)(1)(B).
I's 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c).
159 Notice of Antidumping Duty Order, supra note 71.
160 Notice of Preliminary Determination of Sales, supra note 95. The DOC based this determination
on valuation of factors of production in the surrogate country of Bangladesh. Id. at 4992. For additional
discussion of Bangladesh's selection as a surrogate country for Vietnam, see infra Part V.B.3.a. See also
Memorandum from Alex Villanueva and Paul Walker, Case Analyst, through James C. Doyle, Program
Manager, to Edward C. Yang, Office IX (Jan. 24, 2003) (on file with author).161 The dumping margin ranged from 37.94 to 63.88 percent (the amount that normal value exceeded
export price). Notice of Preliminary Determination of Sales, supra note 95, at 4997.
1 Notice of Antidumping Duty Order, supra note 71.
163 Notice of Final Antidumping Duty Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value and Affirmative
Critical Circumstances: Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 68 Fed. Reg.
37116(June 23, 2003) [hereinafter Notice of Final Antidumping Duty Determination].
I Notice of Antidumping Duty Order, supra note 71. The anti-dumping order lists a separate duty
for each of eleven different Vietnamese catfish producers and one Vietnam-Wide duty. Id. at 47910. The
Vietnam-Wide duty is to be applied to producers who failed to respond to DOC investigatory
questionnaires and therefore did not "demonstrate entitlement to a separate rate." Notice of Preliminary
Determination of Sales, supra note 95, at 4992.
165 An Giang Complaint, supra note 141, at 7-9.
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valuing the factors used to produce the whole fish.166 The DOC calculation
relied on a method of production that was completely contrary to the method
reflected in arguments submitted by the Vietnamese producers during the
investigation process.' 67 The Vietnamese lawsuit challenging the DOC's
method of calculation 168 is still pending in the CIT.
V. THE VIETNAMESE PRODUCERS' CASE AGAINST THE DOC
DEMONSTRATES THAT A BROADER STANDARD OF REVIEW IS
NECESSARY TO INCREASE DOC AccOUNTABILrrY
This lawsuit, and the growing trade dispute it represents, may
destabilize the nascent relationship between the United States and Vietnam
if left unaddressed. However, the two fora available to hear this type of
trade dispute-the DOC and the CIT-are unlikely to provide adequate
redress for Vietnamese concerns due to existing structural and procedural
limitations. For example, the CIT cannot adequately reconcile decisions on
similar issues because each decision is made on a case-by-case basis,
provides no precedential value, and the court is bound by a limited standard
of review.16 9  In the case of Vietnamese catfish, the CIT's inherent
limitations compound the DOC's flawed decision-making process and
threaten lasting harm to trade between the United States and Vietnam.
A. The Structure of the CIT Limits its Utility
Although Congress reorganized the CIT to specifically scrutinize
DOC anti-dumping decisions, the CIT is still hampered by its deferential
standard of review and inability to use precedent to guide its decisions.
1. The Reorganization of the CIT Has Not Deterred the DOC From
Abusing Its Discretion
Reorganized by Congress in 1980, the CIT is now meant to provide
166Id.
167 Memorandum from Barbara E. Tillman, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import
Administration, Group ll, to Joseph A. Spetrini, Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration
(June 16, 2003), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/snumnary/vietnam/03-15794-l.pdf (last visited Feb.
11, 2004) [hereinafter Tillman Memorandum].
'6' An Giang Complaint, supra note 141.
169 See discussion infra Part V.A.
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more transparency in DOC anti-dumping decisions. 170  Congress believed
that CIT review would encourage the DOC to be more conscientious about
explaining its decisions,' 71 thereby controlling unfettered executive branch
discretion. 72 In its reorganized form,'173 the CIT is an Article III court 74 that
hears civil actions arising from U.S. international trade law.' 75  Although
technically a trial court, the CIT functions as an appellate court for
government agencies.' 76 The appellate nature of the court requires it to act
with significant deference, creating a situation where government agencies
ultimately make final decisions. 77  While CIT review may have improved
the situation, it has not solved the problem. In order to provide a truly
effective check, the CIT must be able to set precedent and review the DOC's
decisions using a broader standard of review.
78
2. Because of Its Deferential Standard of Review, the CIT Cannot
Provide a Sufficient Check on the DOC
The CIT employs an extremely deferential standard of review, which
limits its utility. The CIT applies the substantial evidence standard,
179
170 James A. Toupin, The U.S. Court of International Trade and the U.S. International Trade
Commission After Ten Years -A Personal View, 14 FORDHAM INT'LL.J. 10, 11 (1991).
171 Id.
172 Leonard M. Shambon, Accomplishing the Legislative Goals for the US. Court of International
Trade: More Speed! More Speed!, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 31, 32 (1991).
173 The modem CIT is the result of almost one hundred years of evolution. The CIT's earliest
predecessor was the Board of General Appraisers, established by Congress in 1890. This board reviewed
"appraisals of imported goods and classifications of tariffs." In 1908 the Board was relieved of
administrative duties and granted U.S. Circuit Court powers to compel testimony and punish contempt. In
1926 the name of the court was changed to the U.S. Customs Court. The Tariff Act of I30 traasferred
administrative support from the treasury to the Justice Department and a 1956 ?c declared the court
established under Article III, FEDERAL JUDICIAL HIsTORY, U.S. COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 1980-,
at htt://www.fic.gov/history/home.nsf/page/customcitbdy (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
4 28 U.S.C. § 251(a) (2000). An Article III court derives its jurisdiction from U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2. Its judges are appointed for life. Id. art. III, § 1.
17' 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (2000). The CIT has a "residual grant of exclusive jurisdictional authority to
decide any civil action against the United States, its officers, or its agencies arisilg out of any law
pertaining to international trade." In addition, the CIT has "exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of certain
civil actions brought by the United States under the laws governing import transactions, as well as
counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party actions relating to actions pending in e coz-" s well as
certain other specified types of subject matter jurisdiction, U.S. COURTS, JURISDICTON OF THE COURT, at
http://www.cit.uscourts.gov/informational/about.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2004) (referencing the Customs
Courts Act of 1980).
'76 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (2000).
177 Toupin, supra note 170, at 25.
178 This Comment does not address how these changes might be implemented.
'9 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i).
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defined as "something less than the weight of the evidence,"' when
reviewing DOC findings. This standard requires the reviewing court to
restrict its own review 's ' and be extremely deferential. 8 2 Indeed, the CIT
must sustain the DOC's determination unless it is "unsupported by
substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with
law."' 83  If the DOC's interpretation of the evidence is "sufficiently
reasonable, it will be sustained and it need not be the only reasonable
interpretation."'4 When a remand does occur under this standard, it often
merely asks for an explanation of the DOC's finding. 5 Thus, DOC
commissioners may easily review a report upon remand and still come to the
same conclusion.' 6 As a result, the DOC is rarely forced to change the
outcome of its reports.1
8 7
The deferential standard of review used by the CIT severely limits the
possibility of appellate relief. Furthermore, were the Vietnamese farmers to
appeal the CIT decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
they would face the same deferential standard of review. 88  Trade cases
heard in the Federal Circuit are rarely granted certiorari to the U.S. Supreme
Court, in part because no circuit split controversy exists. 9 The CIT's
deferential standard of review is one factor that will prevent the current
dumping conflict from being resolved justly and in a manner that stabilizes
U.S.-Vietnam trade relations.
'g Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 750 F.2d 927, 933 (Fed. Cit. 1984) (quoting Consolo
v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 619-620 (1966)).
'8' Mitsubishi Elec. Corp. v. United States, 700 F. Supp. 538, 552 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
182 See e.g., Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 149 (1997) ("The substantial evidence
standard is extremely deferential to the factfmder..."); Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum
Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 705 (1980) ("As we have emphasized, however, judicial review under the substantial
evidence test is ultimately deferential.").
'8 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B).
' Mitsubishi, 700 F. Supp. at 552. See also Matsushita, 750 F.2d at 933 (quoting Consolo, 383 U.S.
at 619-620) ("[T]he possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent
an administrative agency's findings from being supported by substantial evidence.").
18S See, e.g., USX Corp. v. United States, 698 F. Supp 487 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987); Maine Potato
Council v. United States, 613 F. Supp. 1237 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985); SCM Corp. v. United States, 544 F.
Supp. 194, 196 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982) ("Clearly, the Commission's new statement did not recast any of the
reasons articulated in its original statement, and the orders of remand did not oblige the Commission to
arrive at a different substantive result.").
186 Toupin, supra note 170, at 25.
17 Id.
'88 Herbert C. Shelley et al., The Standard of Review Applied by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit in International Trade and Customs Cases, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1749, 1756 (1996).189 Toupin, supra note 170, at 19. See also SuP. Cr. R. 17.
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3. The CIT Cannot Provide a Lasting Solution Because Its Decisions
Have No Precedential Value
A CIT decision binds only the parties involved in that dispute and
creates no precedent for other CIT judges or the DOC. 90 Although stare
decisis counsels the CIT in extreme cases,' 9' the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit' 92 has held that a decision by one CIT judge does not bind
the other judges on the court. 93  Therefore, analysis of past CIT opinions
can only suggest a possible outcome in any given case. In the current case,
for example, two decisions exist that should have limited the discretion of
the DOC and provided the method of valuing factors of production.
94
Because the CIT decisions are not binding, however, these cases did not
limit or otherwise appear to affect the DOC's investigation into Vietnam's
alleged catfish dumping in the United States. Instead, the DOC had the
freedom to ignore the method of valuation advised in prior CIT cases.
B. The DOC's Method of Valuing Factors of Production is Unsupported
by the Evidence and Not in Accordance with Current Law
The CIT's deferential review of the DOC's dumping determination
and the lack of precedential value provided by other CIT cases are both
factors that threaten to limit the Vietnamese producers' likelihood of
successfully appealing the DOC decision. Two of the producers' five
complaints against the DOC merit critical review by the CIT.' 95 The first
count claims that the DOC did not follow regulation, statute, or practice
when calculating normal value in a non-market economy. 96  The second
count claims that the DOC disregarded relevant factors when calculating
:90 Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2 d 240, 243 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
191 See, e.g., American Lamb Co. v. United States, 611 F. Supp 979, 981 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985) (when
defendant's arguments had been rejected three times within the year by two judges on the CIT, the court,
faced with these same arguments a fourth time, considered itself bound by the three prior rejections).
192 There is a right of appeal from the CIT to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, formerly the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. Act of Oct. 10, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94
Stat. 1727.
:93 Algoma Steel, 865 F.2d at 243.
194 See infra Part V.B.2.
195 The final three counts of the complaint are 1) the DOC did not correctly distribute the different
names each business imported under, causing the importers to have to pay the higher country-wide rates, 2)
the DOC used incomplete factual information, and 3) the DOC made general errors in its report. An Giang
Complaint, supra note 141, at 8-9.
'96 Id. at 7.
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normal value. 197 For each count, the CIT must find the DOC's report to be
supported by substantial evidence in the record and to be in accordance with
the law. 198 The burden of showing otherwise lies with the Vietnamese
producers.' 99 Although the CIT permits some deviation from established
methods, the DOC fails to meet the standards required for such deviations.
As part of its anti-dumping investigation, the DOC has a duty to
determine the normal value of the product named in the anti-dumping
complaint.200 The process the DOC uses to determine normal value must
follow the "well-established method" of valuing all factors of production,
including the primary factors of production.20' In some circumstances, the
DOC is permitted to deviate from the well-established method of
determination, but there are two restrictions on permitted deviation. 20 2 The
DOC inappropriately deviated from the well-established method because it
did not value the Vietnamese producers' primary factors of production and
did not meet either of the two restrictions.
1. The DOC Must Determine Normal Value in Accordance with
Legislation, Prior CIT Decisions, and Common DOC Practice
The DOC decision should be remanded because the DOC did not
calculate normal value20 3 using the method established legislatively,
judicially, and through practice. 204 The Tariff Act of 1930205 describes the
appropriate method for determining normal value in the case of non-market
economies.20 6 The Tariff Act requires that normal value be determined by
assigning values to factors of production such as fish feed, farmer's labor,
and cages.207 The DOC assigns value to factors of production based on the
value of these same factors in a comparable surrogate market economy.
208
In this case, the DOC did not correctly identify all of the Vietnamese
producers' factors of production. This abuse of discretion resulted in a
197 Id. at 7-8.
190 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(i)(B)(i).
'99 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1).
200 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(a).
20 See discussion infra Part V.B.2.
202 See discussion infra Part V.B.3.
203 Normal value is the price at which the product is sold in the exporting country. 19 U.S.C. §
167To(a)(l)(B)(i).
204 See infra Part V.B.1-3.
205 As codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1677b.
206 Id. § 1677b(c). See also 19 C.F.R. § 351.408.
207 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1)(B).
208 Id.
VOL. 13 No. 2
CATFISH WARS: VIETNAM'S FIGHT FOR FREE TRADE
valuation method that was not supported by the evidence or in accordance
with the law.
2. Case Law Defines the Well-Established Method of Determining
Normal Value
Two very recent CIT decisions, Pacific Giant, Inc. v. United States209
and Anshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. v. United States,210 further define the
correct method for determining normal value in non-market economies and
address the role of primary and intermediate2 1' factors of production.212 For
example, the plaintiff in Anshan Iron, a steel producer, used energy in its
production process. 213 Because Anshan Iron did not purchase the energy,
but generated it itself, the energy was an intermediate factor of production
and the coal used to produce the energy was a primary factor of
production. 214 According to the CIT decision, the well-established method is
to assign surrogate values to the primary factors of production, such as coal,
used to create self-produced intermediate factors of production, such as
energy.21 5
In Pacific Giant, the court defined "factor of production" as any input
used for more than incidental purposes.216 The Pacific Giant court found
that well water consumed in the process of producing crawfish meat was
used for more than incidental purposes.217 The court held that any such
218input must be valued. Just one year later, the CIT elaborated further upon
this concept in Anshan Iron. In that case, the CIT held that the DOC's
decision to assign surrogate values to the producer's intermediate factors of
production and not the producer's primary factors of production
209 Pacific Giant, Inc. v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2002) (Chinese
producers of freshwater crawfish tail meat contested an antidumping determination on grounds that the
DOC incorrectly applied surrogate values to well water used in the production process).
210 Anshan Iron & Steel Co. v. United States, 27 CIT _, 2003 WL 22018898, at *9 (Ct. Int'l
Trade July 16, 2003) (Chinese producers of hot rolled steel products contested an antidumping
determination on the grounds that intermediate factors had been valued on their face instead of determining
their value using the primary factors used to create them).
211 Primary factors of production are used to produce intermediate factors of production which, in
turn, are used to produce the final product. The Tariff Act of 1930 does not differentiate between primary
factors of production and intermediate factors of production.
212 Anshan, 2003 WL 22018898; Pacific Giant, 223 F. Supp. 2d at 1336.
23 Anshan, 2003 WL 22018898.
214 Id. at * 1-2.
215 Id. at *3.
216 Pacific Giant, 223 F. Supp. 2d at 1346.
217 Id.
218 Id.
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"constitute[d] a deviation from [the DOC's] established practice to value the
factors of production of self-produced intermediate inputs. ''219 The court
had two reasons for this decision. First, under the statute governing the
method of determining normal value in an alleged dumping case,22° the court
found that the DOC could interpret the statute on a case-by-case basis.
221
The court, however, held that this discretion is limited by its own, consistent
interpretation of the statute.222 The court has consistently interpreted the
anti-dumping statute 223 as requiring the DOC to determine normal value of a
non-market economy product in the same manner as it would a market
economy product.224 This means the DOC must assign surrogate values to
primary factors of production.225
In Anshan Iron, the CIT also quoted the DOC's own explanation of its
established practice for determining the normal value of a non-market
economy product.226 The DOC summarized its practice as collecting data
for all direct inputs used in producing the product and "any indirect inputs
used in the in-house production of any direct input., 227 For example, the
court required consideration of the coal used by the plaintiff in Anshan Iron
to produce energy.228 Therefore, the DOC established, and the CIT
confirmed, that the well-established method of calculating a product's value
in a non-market economy is to assign surrogate values to both primary and
intermediate factors of production.
By ignoring statutory requirements, prior CIT decisions, and its own
practices, the DOC deviated from the well-established method of assigning
surrogate value to the primary factors of production, and therefore abused its
discretion. Instead of assigning values to primary production factors such as
labor, energy, feed, and fingerlings, the DOC assigned value only to the
intermediate factor of production-the whole adult catfish used for
219 Anshan, 2003 WL 22018898, at *9.
220 The governing statute is 19 U.S.C. § 1677b.
22' Anshan, 2003 WL 22018898, at *3 (citing Timken Co. v. United States, 166 F. Supp. 2d 608, 616
(Ct. Int'l Trade 2001)).
2n2id.
m 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c).
22 Anshan, 2003 WL 22018898, at *3 (citing Timken Co. v. United States, 166 F. Supp. 2d 608, 616
(Ct. Int'l Trade 2001)).
225 id.
n6 Id. at *4 (citing Certain Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, Cut-to-Length
Carbon Steel Plate from the People's Republic of China, 62 Fed. Reg. 61,964 (Nov. 20, 1997)).
227 Id.
228 Id. at *16.
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processing.229 If CIT decisions were binding, the DOC would have had to
follow the method outlined in Anshan Iron and Pacific Giant. Because the
court's decisions are not binding, the DOC was able to make its
determination to impose tariffs on Vietnamese catfish using a method that is
inconsistent with prior determinations.
3. Permitted Deviation from the Well-Established Method of Valuation
and Its Two Restrictions
While the CIT has held that the DOC may deviate from the
well-established method,230 any such deviation is subject to at least two
restrictions.23' First, in the interest of fairness,232 the DOC cannot deviate
from the well-established methodology if a respondent "has detrimentally
relied on an old methodology used in previous reviews., 233 Second, the
DOC must explain changes in methodology in a manner that is in
accordance with the law and supported by substantial evidence.234
A well-established method has been detrimentally relied on if the
parties believed it was the method in use at the time of the investigation.
235
This belief may be based on methodology used in previous DOC reviews.236
If such reliance has occured, the respondents must be notified of a change in
methodology so that they have a final opportunity to comment.237 If there is
no notification, their reliance is detrimental.238
The Vietnamese producers relied on the well-established method of
assigning surrogate value to primary factors of production to their detriment.
Despite an on-going investigation, the DOC apparently never notified the
parties that a deviation from the normal method, as established by statute,
case law, and practice, would be used. The DOC contended throughout the
investigation and in the final report that the method used was "simply an
229 Tillman Memorandum, supra note 167, at 41. See also Notice of Final Antidumping Duty
Determination, supra note 163.
230 Fujian Mach. & Equip. Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1327 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2001).
231 Anshan Iron & Steel Co. v. United States, 27 CIT _______ 2003 WL 22018898, at *6 (Ct. Int'l
Trade July 16,2003).
232 Shikoku Chem. Corp. v. United States, 795 F. Supp. 417, 421 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1992).
233 Anshan, 2003 WL 22018898, at *6.
24 Id.
235 Shikoku, 795 F. Supp. at 421-22.
236 id.
237 Anshan, 2003 WL 22018898, at *6.
238 id.
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articulation of the current policy. '239 The report, however, shows that this
was not actually the case, and the DOC did not notify the parties of a
deviation from the well-established method, to the detriment of the
Vietnamese producers.
A sufficient explanation for a method change is one that is supported
with substantial evidence and in accordance with the law.240 Such an
explanation is necessary because it gives the reviewing court a basis for
understanding the DOC's actions and allows the court to "jud e the
consistency of that action with the agency's general mandate." 24  An
explanation for deviation is not in accordance with law if the reasoning is
"inconsistent with the statutory mandate, 242 or, to a lesser extent, if "the
reasoning (or lack thereof) violates general principles of administrative
law.
, 243
The DOC's explanation for the change in methodology was not
supported by substantial evidence or in accordance with the law. The
reasoning given for the change is not based on the facts and is inconsistent
with prior decisions and statutory mandate. The DOC exceeded its
discretion because it deviated from the well-established method without
giving an appropriate explanation. The DOC gave three reasons for not
valuing the primary factors of production: (1) financial information from
companies in the surrogate country; (2) level of integration; and (3)
problems with the upstream data. However, these explanations are
insufficient because they are not supported with substantial evidence or in
accordance with the law. Therefore, the DOC's deviation from the
well-established method should not be permitted.
239 Tiinan Memorandum, supra note 167, at 45. Given the context of this quotation and the
Vietnamese producers' argument, the author assumes that by "policy" the DOC refers to the method of
determining normal value.240 Anshan, 2003 WL 22018898, at *6.
241 Cultivos Miramonte S.A. v. United States, 980 F. Supp. 1268, 1274 n.6 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1997)
(citing Chennault v. Dep't of Navy, 796 F.2d 465, 467 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
42 Id. at 1274 n.7.
243 Id.
24 Tillman Memorandum, supra note 167, at 41.
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a. If CIT decisions had precedential value, Anshan Iron would force the
DOC to use the well-established method and thus base its
determination on the Vietnamese producer's method of production
and not that of the surrogate company
The first reason the DOC gave for not valuing primary factors of
production was the financial information collected from companies in the
surrogate country, Bangladesh. 45 The DOC chose Bangladesh as the
surrogate market economy country because the DOC found that, pursuant to
the Tariff Act of 1930,246 Bangladesh was a significant producer of
comparable merchandise and is at a similar level of economic
development.247  Within Bangladesh, the DOC looked for surrogate
companies that did not receive government subsidies, produced only catfish,
and used the same production process as the Vietnamese producers.248
Finding surrogate companies with these similarities allowed the DOC to
assign value to Vietnamese factors of production using Bangladeshi prices.
From a list of seven possible companies, 249 the DOC used financial data
from two Bangladeshi shrimp processing companies, Apex and Bionic Sea
Food Exports. 250 Neither company raises its own shrimp. 25' The other five
companies were fish or shrimp farming companies that do not appear from
the record to be processors.252
The record also provides financial data for six Indian companies,
however, the DOC did not ultimately use any of this data. 3 Of these six
Indian companies, three were disqualified because petitioners failed to
submit the necessary financial statements and another was disqualified for
receiving a government subsidy. 4 The final two companies were Euro
Marine and Waterbase.2  The financial statements for Euro Marine
suggested that it was an integrated fish-raising and processing company
similar to the Vietnamese respondent companies. 256 The DOC, however,
245 id.
246 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4)(A)-(B).
247 Notice of Preliminary Determination of Sales, supra note 95, at 4992.
248 Tillman Memorandum, supra note 167, at 42.
.249 Id. at41.
250 Id. at 42.
25 Id.
252 Id.
23 Id.
2 id.
255 id.
256 id.
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disqualified Euro Marine as a surrogate because its output was listed as
"frozen marine products," a discription the DOC found to be insufficiently
specific.25 7 The final Indian company, Waterbase, was also an integrated
raising and processing facility, but was nonetheless disqualified because
there was no indication that it used river-based cages similar to those used
by Vietnamese farmers.258 Having settled on Apex and Bionic Sea Food
Exports, the DOC found that using the value of the whole fish as input
would "complement the use of these companies. ' 259
Deviating from the well-established method on the basis of financial
information from companies in the surrogate country is inconsistent with the
CIT decision in Anshan Iron. If the CIT were a precedent-setting court,
Anshan Iron would have directed the DOC during its investigation. In
Anshan Iron, the DOC disregarded inputs used to generate electricity
because the surrogate company did not generate their own electricity.260 The
DOC reasoned that valuing the Vietnamese producers' actual input would
create an improper calculation of normal value.26' The CIT rejected this
determination in Anshan Iron because the DOC's reasoning was not
supported by evidence or in accordance with law.262 In the current case, the
DOC reasoned that valuing the whole fish would complement the use of the
Bangladeshi surrogate companies because the surrogate companies were• 2 6 3
only processors and did not raise their own seafood. Like Anshan Iron,
the CIT should remand the case at hand for flawed reasoning.
b. Prior CIT decisions suggest, and federal statute demands, that the
DOC value factors ofproduction utilized by the Vietnamese producers
for more than incidental purposes and recognize that Vietnamese
production is integrated
The second reason the DOC gave for valuing the whole fish as a
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 id.
260 Anshan Iron & Steel Co. v. United States, 27 CIT ______ 2003 WL 22018898, at *6-7 (Ct. Int'l
Trade July 16, 2003)
26' Id. at *6.
262 Id.
263 Tillman Memorandum, supra note 167, at 42. The DOC decision presumes that the value of the
whole fish will "encapsulate the relevant financial information for the upstream stages." This is not
supported by any facts in the memo. Furthermore, the Vietnamese producers assert that the choice to raise
the fish themselves is an integral part of the business and affects efficiency, id. at 28, showing that the two
scenarios are in fact very different.
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factor of production was the level of integration of raising and processing in
Vietnamese companies. The DOC found that the Vietnamese companies
were not sufficiently integrated to warrant valuing the factors used to
produce the whole fish.26 This argument is based on information that shows
a number of the Vietnamese companies rent the cages to raise the fish that
they later process. 265 Although the companies rent the cages, they provide
the labor, energy, feed, and fingerlings necessary to produce the fish.266
Because a portion of the rental fee is linked to the number of fish raised, the
DOC found that the Vietnamese companies did not incur the entire risk of
production and therefore were not fully integrated.267 The DOC report also
stated that using input factors of labor, energy, feed, and fingerlings would
introduce inaccuracies.
268
Deviation from the well-established method based on classification of
Vietnamese producers as non-integrated is an insufficient explanation
because it is not based on the facts. The facts show that the Vietnamese
producers are integrated because they provide inputs to produce the whole
fish.269 Integration must be recognized because, under the U.S. Code of
Federal Regulations, the DOC is required to value these inputs. 270  The
regulations require the DOC to value factors of production actually
utilized. 27' These factors include labor, raw materials, energy and utilities,
and capital costs. 2 72 The facts show that the Vietnamese producers have
inputs of labor, energy, feed, and fingerlings in the production of the whole
fish.273 Under the governing regulation, these inputs must be recognized,
and concurrently, it must be recognized that the Vietnamese producers'
process is in fact integrated.
Case law addressing the determination of normal value establishes
that the DOC should value all input that is more than incidental to the
production of the finished good.274 Labor, energy, feed, and fingerlings are
more than incidental to the catfish farming and production process because,
16 Id. at 44.
265 id.
266 Id. at 36.
267 Id. at 44.
268 Id. The report does not explain why this method would result in an inaccurate valuation but
suggests that using "all these factors" would produce a calculation that was complicated or difficult.
269 id.
270 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(a).
271 id.
272 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(3)(A)-(D).
273 Tillman Memorandum, supra note 167, at 44.
274 Pacific Giant, Inc. v. United States, 223 F. Supp.2d 1336, 1346 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2002).
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by providing these inputs, the Vietnamese producers control the quality and
efficiency of their production process. 275 In fact, the Vietnamese producers
claim that not valuing these factors of production will reject more than
seventy-five percent of their reported factors.276 A deviation from the
well-established method is not warranted based on the Vietnamese
producers' level of integration.
c. A claim of inadequate data is not a sufficient explanation for
deviating from the well-established method because it is incumbent on
the DOC to collect all data necessary for analysis
Finally, the DOC reasoned that the whole fish must be valued instead
of its primary factors of production because there were "a number of
problems" with the primary factors of production data provided by the
Vietnamese companies. They found that factors of production were
unreported or misreported and this problem could not be remedied because
there was insufficient data and lack of surrogate values.278
Insufficient data is not a satisfactory explanation for deviating from
the well-established method of calculating normal value. It is incumbent on
the DOC to collect all the data necessary for analysis.279 If the DOC does
not find the information submitted to be sufficient, it must notify the
respondents. 28  According to the complaint filed with the CIT, the
Vietnamese producers complied with all DOC requests for data.28  If full
compliance on the part of the Vietnamese producers did not provide
sufficient data for constructing the non-market economy value, it was
275 Tillman Memorandum, supra note 167, at 28. Note that U.S. producers also emphasize their
control over the entire production process in their advertising, claiming that it is what makes their product
high quality.
I d.
277 Id. at 44.
278 Id. at 45.
279 Mitsubishi, 700 F. Supp. 538, 564 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988) (citing Kenda Rubber Indus. Co., v.
United States, 630 F. Supp. 354 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986) (interpreting 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(D)).
290 19 U.S.C. § 1677m.
281 An Giang Complaint, supra note 141, at 3-6. Had the Respondents been uncooperative or unable
to produce the necessary information, the DOC would have been at liberty to imply adverse inferences. 19
U.S.C. § 1677e. It seems, however, that the DOC deemed Respondents cooperative because none are
subject to the Viemam-Wide dumping margins. Notice of Final Antidumping Duty Determination, supra
note 163. In fact, the DOC wrote that, as of the preliminary report, all six non-mandatory respondents
"cooperated in providing all the information the Department requested of them." Notice of Preliminary
Determination of Sales, supra note 95, at 4992.
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incumbent on the DOC to request further information.28 2
The DOC's argument that it lacked accurate surrogate values is also
inadequate given the many possible surrogate companies listed in the DOC
report.283 The DOC notes that the problems with the data could not be
remedied because no surrogate company was available to properly value
primary factors of production.284 The DOC, however, rejected the Indian
company Waterbase 285 as a possible surrogate company on the grounds that
usable information from the primary surrogate country exists. 286  This
explanation is contradictory in light of the DOC report.
The DOC did not have the freedom to deviate from the
well-established method because the two restrictions on deviation were not
met. The Vietnamese producers detrimentally relied on the well-established
methodology and the DOC failed to provide a sufficient explanation for the
deviation. The methodology used in the report to calculate normal value is
incorrect and reflects an abuse of discretion on the part of the DOC. Broader
review of the DOC by the CIT, coupled with precedent-setting decisions,
would help to prevent such abuses.
VI. CONCLUSION
Current friendly relations between the United States and Vietnam,
largely based on trade, have resulted in both economic cooperation and
industry competition. This phenomenon is evidenced in the catfish industry.
Cooperation between the two countries initially led to the development of a
Vietnamese catfish farming industry but ultimately resulted in conflict
between Vietnamese and U.S. producers. The conflict provides a case study
of the efficacy of the current U.S. system for resolving such trade disputes
and suggests areas for potential reform.
Structural changes are needed in the way international trade conflicts
are resolved in the U.S. The CIT's deferential standard of review provides
no significant check on the discretion of the DOC, thus reducing the DOC's
282 Mitsubishi, 700 F. Supp. at 564 (citing Kenda Rubber Indus. Co. v. United States, 630 F. Supp.
354 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986) (interpreting 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(D)).
283 Tillman Memorandum, supra note 167, at 41.
24 Id. at 45.
285 Waterbase used a fully integrated production process, just as the Vietnamese producers do.
286 Statute dictates that the DOC's normal practice is to value factors of production first from the
primary surrogate country when appropriate data are available. 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(2). However, the
final report states that in the event that no surrogate value is available in the primary surrogate country,
concerns with using a secondary surrogate country can be overcome. Tillman Memorandum, supra note
167, at 43.
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accountability. Moreover, CIT decisions create no precedent. Thus, even if
the CIT requires the DOC to recalculate normal value in this case, as it
should, the court's decision will provide no guidance to parties in future
cases. Because of these structural defects, the CIT is not a stabilizing force
in U.S. economic relations. To encourage trade with new partners and
maintain relations with Vietnam, the United States should consider
modifying its procedures for review of trade disputes. Because the
Vietnamese producers' case is still pending, an opportunity currently exists
for renewing positive trade relations with Vietnam by requiring the DOC to
utilize methods established by legislation, case law, and its own past
practices.
